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TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
by
The Board of Editors*
I.

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

P

ERFECTION of appeal was the subject of several cases in the past year.
In Breeze v. Livingston' the defendant was granted a summary judgment
in the trial court, and the plaintiffs filed notice of appeal. When after three
months the plaintiffs had neither filed a brief for appeal nor moved for an
extension of time for filing, the defendants filed their brief requesting that
the court of civil appeals either dismiss the appeal or affirm the judgment of
the trial court. The court affirmed the judgment below on the basis of rule
416,' which allows the court to accept the brief of the appellee as a correct
presentation of the case when the appellant fails to file a brief.
Star Corp. v. Wolfe5 involved the question of whether the appellant corporation was entitled to a reversal of judgment of the trial court in favor of
Wolfe because the trial judge was late in filing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The requested findings and conclusions were not filed until ten
days before the transcript was due on appeal, and the corporation contended
that the thirteen-day delay in filing caused it injury and probable harm because it had no time to request additional findings which would have shown
that the judgment was based on a theory of recovery not pleaded by Wolfe.
The court was of the opinion that the corporation's contentions were highly
speculative, conjectural, and "in the nature of a hypothesis,"4 and affirmed the
judgment.
The scope of appellate review was at issue in Sobel v. City of Lacy Lakeview.' The city obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting operation of
Sobel's liquor business because of a city ordinance requiring two toilets in
all buildings other than single-family dwellings. On appeal Sobel attacked
the injunction on constitutional and other grounds. The court upheld the injunction because the scope of appellate review of temporary injunctions is
limited to the question of whether the trial judge's action was a clear abuse
of discretion.
The question of what constitutes "good cause" for an extension under rule
5' of the time limits under rule 386' for filing the trial transcript and statement of facts was the subject of two cases. In Bean v. City of Arlingtonl the
Fort Worth court of civil appeals held that a motion for extension unsupported
by affidavits and alleging only that the appellant's attorney had been ill was
insufficient to show good cause. The court, in Rehkopf v. Texarkana News* The Board of Editors gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dennis L. Lutes, Boyd
Mangrum, and Mark C. Clements in the preparation of this Article.
'468 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971).
2
Tix. R. Civ. P. 416.
'463 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971).
4
1Id. at 294.
5465 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971).
6 TEx. R. Civ. P. 5.
7Id. 386.
8464 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971).
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papers, Inc.,' had granted extensions based on the appellant's allegation, unsupported by affidavits from either the district clerk or court reporter, that
the court reporter could not prepare the transcript and statement of facts in
time for filing within the statutory period. Jurisdiction of the appeal was denied
because the court had erroneously granted the motions for extension, which
were unverified and, therefore, did not show good cause.
In Simon v. BrinkmanW' the losers in the trial court, anticipating an appeal,
made a cash deposit of the amount of the judgment against them with the
court clerk in lieu of an appeal and supersedeas bond. The clerk gave a certificate evidencing this deposit. The losers then decided to bring the case to the
court of civil appeals by writ of error rather than appeal, and the clerk gave
a second certificate acknowledging the cash deposit. No new cash deposit was
made when the writ of error was filed, but after the appeal was dismissed the
cash originally deposited for appeal remained in the hands of the clerk. The
second certificate, which was evidently a copy of the first, stated that the deposit was in lieu of an appeal and supersedeas bond, and not that it was in
lieu of a writ of error bond. The court of civil appeals first took jurisdiction
of the writ of error, reversed the judgment of the trial court, and remanded for
a new trial; 1 however, on rehearing, the court determined that it had no
jurisdiction because of the lack of a bond or deposit for the writ of error proceedings and dismissed the writ of error.1" The Supreme Court of Texas held
that the court of civil appeals had jurisdiction of the writ of error. In holding
that the original cash deposit was sufficient in lieu of a writ of error bond, the
1
court relied on a statement in United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden' that
rule 430' authorizes the amendment of "any sort of instrument which can be
said to be a bond."'" The second certificate issued by the clerk was held to be
such an instrument, and the case was remanded to the court of civil appeals
for a rehearing on the merits.
II. CONTINUANCE

The appellate courts have continued to allow trial judges wide discretion in
granting continuances. The owner and driver of a taxicab were sued by a
passenger for personal injuries resulting from a collision involving the taxicab in Condry v. Mantooth." The court held that a denial of continuance requested because the owner was in the hospital was not an abuse of discretion
since the defendants did not show that the owner's absence prejudiced their
rights or that the owner's testimony would have been material. Personal injuries were also the basis of the action in Linton v. Jones." The defendants
contended that they should have been granted a continuance because they
had not received answers to interrogatories directed to the doctors who treated
'460 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
10459 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1970).
11 449 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970).
12Id. at 93.
13160 Tex. 203, 328 S.W.2d 739 (1959).
4
1 Tux. R. CIv. P. 430.
" 328 S.W.2d at 741.
10460 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.) 1970).
17462 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971).
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the plaintiff, and consequently had not had a chance to direct cross-interrogatories to those doctors. The court held that under rule 19218 the defendant's
failure to file cross-interrogatories before the plaintiff's commission to take
the answers of the doctors by interrogatory was issued amounted to a waiver
of the right to file cross-interrogatories, and sustained the trial judge's denial
of a continuance.
III. JURISDICTION

Two appellate decisions during the survey period involved service of process.
In Franks v. Montandon2 a default judgment was entered against the defendant. On appeal he asserted that the judgment was invalid because the
substituted service of process pursuant to rule 1060 was inadequate since the
trial court failed to consider any oral or written sworn testimony regarding
the impracticality of personally serving the defendant. The appellate court
stated that since rule 106 is "in derogation of the constitutional mandates of
due process,"'" it should be strictly construed. The court reversed the default
judgment, holding that a trial court may not authorize service under rule 106
"without considering evidence of probative value concerning the impracticality
of obtaining service on a party."" In Mobile Pipe-Dillingham v. Stark" a
default judgment was entered against a foreign corporation. Service of process
had been made, but the corporation alleged that the return by the officer
executing the citation was inadequate because the return named a different
corporation as the one on which service had been made as the defendants'
"statutory agent."" The plaintiff had not named any duly authorized agent of
the corporation in his petition. The court reversed the default judgment because there had been no affirmative showing that the corporation named on the
return was a duly authorized agent of the defendant foreign corporation.
The jurisdiction of appellate courts was involved in several cases. In West
Flour Mill, Inc. v. Vance"' the original plaintiff, Vance, held a judgment
against the mill and was seeking to execute. The mill, which did not appeal
the original judgment, petitioned the appellate court to enjoin the sheriff of
McLennan County from executing that judgment pending disposal of its bill
of review. The court refused, holding that it had "no jurisdiction to enjoin the
Sheriff from levying execution on a judgment that has not been superseded, is
not on appeal, and has become final."' In M. C. Winters, Inc. v. Cope' the
appellate court was forced to dismiss an appeal under rule 385' (relating to
interlocutory orders) because the appellant had failed to file his appeal bond
11T.

R. Civ. P. 192.

19465
S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971).
0
TEx. R. Civ. P. 106.
S.W.2d at 801.

21465
2 2
1d.

23468 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971).
24Under TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 8.10 (1956)
corporation's appointed agent.
S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970).
"456
2
1Id. at

481-82.

27467 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971).

18TEx. R. Civ. P. 385.

service may be made on the
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within the twenty days required by rule 385 (a). The court recognized the
principle that the filing of the appeal bond is jurisdictional.
In Sikes v. Crescent Finance Corp." the appellant had already perfected his
appeal when the trial court granted a motion for a new trial. The appellate
court held that the trial court's action was permissible since the new trial was
granted within the period during which the trial court has continuing jurisdiction. In this instance, at least, the perfection of an appeal did not divest the
trial court of jurisdiction to act. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Melton," however, the
appellate court held that after the perfection of the appeal the trial court was
without jurisdiction to reopen the case and admit additional evidence. The
court, thus, refused to apply rule 270,"1 which allows the trial court to permit
introduction of additional evidence "where it clearly appears to be necessary
to the due administration of justice.""2
In Houston Compressed Steel Corp. v. Staten the appellate court was asked
to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.' The court refused because the
questions for determination by the trial court did not involve "technical and
intricate matters of fact." The court held that "[wihere the issue is one inherently judicial in nature, the courts are not ousted from jurisdiction unless
the Legislature, by a valid statute, has explicitly granted exclusive jurisdiction
to the administrative body."'
In Kohls v. KohlsN a divorced father brought suit in Nueces County against
his former wife for a change in custody of their minor child. The former wife
then brought a habeas corpus proceeding involving custody against the father
in Brazoria County, and that court rendered judgment for the father. The
Nueces County court then rendered a summary judgment in favor of the
father, regarding the custody question as res judicata because of the Brazoria
County action. The appellate court reversed, holding that the court in Brazoria
County had no jurisdiction because the Nueces County court had active prior
jurisdiction" of the subject matter and parties.
IV. PARTIES

A conflict between rule 39' and articles 5.22 and 4.04 of the Family Code 9
29456 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970).
30458 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970).
31 TEX. R. Civ. P. 270.
2458 S.W.2d at 545.
33456 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.) 1970).
"' The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is "that the courts cannot or will not determine
a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands . . . experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact .
Id. at 771-72.
MId. at 772.
31461 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1970).
" The Texas Supreme Court has stated that when "two actions involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts having co-ordinate jurisdiction, the court which
first acquires jurisdiction, its power being adequate to administer full justice to the rights of
all concerned, should retain such jurisdiction, undisturbed by the interference of any other
court, and dispose of the whole controversy." Wheeler v. Williams, 158 Tex. 383, 312
S.W.2d 221 (1958).
38 TEX. R. Civ. P. 39. The rule was amended, effective January 1, 1971, and rewritten
to adopt, with minor changes, the provisions of FED. R. Cirv. P. 19.
39
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, arts. 5.22, 4.04 (1971), which were formerly TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4621, 4626 (1960) respectively.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

was the subject of Few v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co.." Mrs. Few, joining
her husband pro forma, sued the defendant workmen's compensation insurer
for total and permanent incapacity resulting from injuries sustained in the
course of her employment. The trial court, naming both Mrs. Few and her
husband in the judgment, held in favor of the plaintiffs, but the court of civil
appeals reversed on the basis that the husband was an indispensable party who
was not joined as required by rule 39.41 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the
court of civil appeals, holding that rule 39 must yield to articles 5.22 and 4.04
of the Family Code, which allow either spouse to sue for personal injuries
without joinder of the other spouse.
In Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Vines' a suit for a declaratory judgment to construe the terms of a division order was brought by Vines, who
was one of a number of royalty owners who had signed identical division
orders regarding gas production. The defendant corporation's plea in abatement, which alleged that the other royalty owners were indispensable parties
who had not been joined as required by the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act' and rule 39," was overruled by the trial court. The court of civil
appeals held that the other royalty owners were indispensable parties because
they would be bound by the construction of the division order, and reversed
the judgment of the trial court in favor of Vines.
The question of what parties may be bound by a prior suit on the basis of
res judicata was involved in Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co." One of the
defendant corporation's trucks was involved in a collision with an automobile
owned by the plaintiff and driven by one Porter. The plaintiff and her deceased
husband were on a trip with Porter and his wife, and were in the automobile at
the time of the accident. Prior to the instant suit Porter had sued the defendant
corporation, and he lost because the jury found that his negligence alone had
been the proximate cause of the accident. The trial court, regarding the findings of fact in Porter's suit as res judicata, granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment against Mrs. Benson. The court of civil appeals affirmed,
holding that Mrs. Benson was bound because the Bensons and the Porters had
been engaged in a joint enterprise as a matter of law, and, therefore, were in
privity. The supreme court, however, reversed, adhering to its position that
only strict privity will suffice in the absence of an identity of parties. The
court indicated that any other holding would deny Mrs. Benson due process.
Brandt v. Village Homes, Inc." involved the general principle that writof-error review cannot be had by parties who actually participated in the actual
trial of the case." The defendant's counsel was present and argued the de40463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971).
41At the time of trial, which was before rule 39 was amended (see note 38 supra),
rule 39 provided that persons having a joint interest shall be made parties. The Texas
Supreme Court held that parties required to be joined under rule 39 were indispensable
parties in Petroleum Anchor Equip. Co. v. Tyra, 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1966).
4459 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), error ref. mr.e.
4'TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (1965).
44 TEx. R. Civ. P. 39.
"468 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1971), rev'g 460 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1970).
46466 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971).
' TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2249a (1971).
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fendant's case at a scheduled hearing on a motion for summary judgment,
but the defendants themselves were not present. The court held that the actual
trial of the case was at that hearing, that the defendants actually participated
in that hearing by counsel, and that, therefore, the defendants were precluded
from review by writ of error.
V. PLEADINGS

Several cases during the year involved the general principle that objections
to the sufficiency of a pleading cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
In Great Southwest Life Insurance Co. v. Camp' the defendant company filed

a plea of privilege, and the burden then was placed on the plaintiff to plead
and prove that the case came within one of the exceptions to the general
venue statute. ' Plaintiff filed a controverting plea which was insufficient because it was merely a general denial of the facts alleged in the defendant's
plea of privilege. The court held that the controverting plea was, nevertheless,
effective because under rule 90 " the defendant's failure to take exception to
the controverting plea resulted in waiver of any defects in the plea. The same
result was reached in International Security Life Insurance Co. v. Howard,"'

in which the defendant insurance company contended on appeal that the
plaintiff had failed to plead and prove that the osteopathic hospital in which
she had been treated was a "legally constituted hospital" under the terms of
the insurance policy involved. The court held for the plaintiff because the
defendant had not objected to the sufficiency of the pleading at trial. In
Lampman v. First National Bank" a trial court decision in favor of Lampman

had been reversed and remanded for a determination of the amount the bank
should recover in attorney's fees. The bank had originally asked for $500,
but on remand it amended its pleadings and requested reasonable attorney's
fees. The bank was awarded $2,150, and Lampman appealed, alleging error
because the bank had not asked for a specific amount in its amended pleading.
The court rejected the error because Lampman's failure to object to the pleading at trial amounted to a waiver of defects under rule 90.'
In Triton Insurance Co. v. Garner" the defendant entered a plea of re-

lease. The validity of the plea was not challenged by any of the plaintiff's
pleadings, but it was the subject of much dispute at trial. The court held that
since the defendant had not objected to plaintiff's pleadings nor to the introduction of evidence concerning the validity of the release, the legal effect was
a trial by agreement under rule 67." Similarly, in International Security Life
Insurance Co. v. Melancon' the plaintiff sued the defendant company for
48464 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971).
4 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (1964).
50 TEx. R. Civ. P. 90.
51456 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970), error ref. n.re.
52463 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
3
5 TEx. R. Civ. P. 90.
54460 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970), error ref. i.e.
11TEx. R. Civ. P. 67 provides in part that "[w~hen issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings."
56463 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-Baumont 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
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negligence in the selection of its agent, who apparently misapplied four blank
checks signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, a widow with little education,
obtained a judgment, and on appeal the company asserted that certain evidence regarding the agent's reputation for honesty and trustworthiness was
improperly admitted because the issue was not raised by the pleadings. The
court held that the company's failure to challenge the pleadings by special
exception amounted to trial of the issue by consent under rule 67."
In Brown v. United States Finance Co.' the defendant's plea of privilege
and the plaintiff's controverting plea were filed in November 1967. Two years
and eleven months elapsed before the trial court held a hearing on the pleas
and overruled the defendant's plea of privilege. On appeal the defendant
argued that the plaintiff's controverting plea had been abandoned, since rule
87" requires a prompt hearing, and that the plaintiff had obviously not shown
diligence in securing a hearing. The court overruled this contention, merely
noting that the trial court should be allowed wide discretion in determining
such matters.
A more complicated pleading problem arose in Texas Gas Utilities Co. v.
Barrett,"° in which the gas company sought to recover minimum payments
under a contract for natural gas service. The gas company originally prayed
for $8,335.05, but in its first amended petition the amount was increased to
$34,737.36. The company then filed four supplemental petitions, each of
which concluded with a prayer for recovery "as in its original petition."'" The
company then asked for leave to file a fifth supplemental petition because of
the "erroneous adoption by reference of the prayer in Plaintiff's Original Petition whereas such reference should have been, and was intended to be, to
Plaintiff's First Amended Original Petition.""2 The trial court denied the motion and rendered a take nothing judgment, since the defendant had already
paid the lesser amount asked for in the original petition. On appeal the Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that the fifth supplemental petition was
unnecessary, that the first amended original petition was the controlling pleading, and that there was at least a trial by agreement of everything raised by
that pleading.
Starlight Supply Co. v. Feris involved a suit on a sworn account to recover the price of electrical fixtures that Starlight sold to Feris, who installed
them in the home of Slayton. Judgment was rendered for Starlight against
Feris, but not against Slayton. Starlight appealed the judgment as to Slayton,
contending that the dismissal of the action against Slayton was improper because Slayton's denial had not been sworn to as required by rule 185. "4 The
appellate court affirmed, adhering to the principle that rule 185 does not apply
to third parties to the transaction.
5 TEX. R. CIV. P. 67.

58463 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971).

'9TEx.

R. Civ. P. 87.
0460 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. 1970).

" Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
2
Id. at 415-16 (emphasis added).
63462 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970).
64TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.
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VI. LIMITATIONS

5
Rigo Manufacturing Co. v., Thomas"
involved the question of when the
plaintiffs "commenced" suit within the meaning of article 5539a,' which provides for sixty-day tolling of statutes of limitations between the time a suit
is dismissed by a court lacking jurisdiction and the time the suit is later
"commenced" in a court of proper jurisdiction. The plaintiffs asserted two
causes of action against Rigo, a foreign corporation, which arose when their
child died after drinking an insecticide manufactured by Rigo. The action for
wrongful death was subject to a two-year statute of limitations,' and the action
under the survival statute was subject to a three-year limitation.' Plaintiffs
filed suit in federal district court within two years after the death of their
child, but that court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction two years,
three months, and sixteen days after the causes of action accrued. The suit was
refiled in a state court within the sixty days specified by article 5539a, and the
plaintiffs immediately had Rigo served with nonresident notice under rule
108.69 Rigo made a special appearance challenging the sufficiency of that
service, but the court did not sustain the plea until seventeen and one-half
months after the suit was refiled. Proper citatiod was then promptly issued
and served on Rigo, which contended that the actions were then barred by
the statutes of limitations. The Supreme Court of Texas applied the rule that
diligence in procuring the issuance and service of citation, not the mere filing
of a suit, is required to toll a statute of limitations, and held that the plaintiffs'
use of service under rule 108, which could not possibly bring the defendant
foreign corporation before the court,"' was insufficient to toll the statute of
limitations. The actions were thus barred because they were not "commenced"
within the sixty-day period for refiling set out in article 5539a.
A similar problem was involved in Gatlin v. Mason,' in which suit was
filed approximately one month before the limitations period would have run.
Citation was issued immediately, but the defendant was not served because he
was ill. The defendant died within the limitation period, but the plaintiff was
not aware of that fact until service of citation under rule 106 ," was returned.
Plaintiff's counsel immediately checked the probate records, and found neither
an application for administration nor any other record concerning the estate
of the defendant. The defendant's widow was subsequently appointed administratrix of her husband's estate, the parties attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a settlement, and the widow as administratrix was finally served approxi-

6-5458 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1970).

"ITEx.
REV.
7

CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (1958).

Id. art. 5526.

" In addition to the normal two-year limitation, id., art. 5538 provides for tolling in
survival actions for either one year or until an administrator or executor is qualified, whichever comes first.
19TEX.

R. Civ. P. 108 provides for notice to out-of-state resident defendants or non-

resident defendants.
" Proper service was under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964), the "longarm" statute.
71 In personam jurisdiction cannot be acquired under rule 108. Huggins v. Kinsey, 414

S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), error ref., cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968).
72 459 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970).
3
1 TEX. R. Civ. P. 106.
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mately seven months after the statute of limitations would have run and
approximately five months after she was appointed administratrix. Article
5538" provides that the statute of limitations is tolled between the death of
a defendant and the qualification of the administrator of his estate. Recognizing that a plaintiff has the duty to exercise reasonable diligence to perfect
service of process, the court held that a jury determination of that fact question in favor of the plaintiff would stand.
In Brandom Manufacturing Corp. v.Bascom" the court held that evidence
was sufficient to support a jury finding that by reasonable diligence the plaintiff
should have discovered the fraud of which he was complaining in 1961. The
statute of limitations on fraud begins to run either from the time the fraud is
actually discovered or from the time it could have been discovered by the use
of reasonable diligence;" therefore, the cause of action filed in 1968 was
barred.
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A year ago in Gibbs v. General Motors Corp." the Texas Supreme Court
stated that the question involved in granting a summary judgment "is not
whether the summary judgment proof raises fact issues ... but .. .whether
the summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of law that there is no
genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff's
cause of action."" Several cases during the past year dealt with the application
of this test. In Oliver v. Allstate Insurance Co."8 Allstate claimed that the
policy sued on by the plaintiff was not in effect on the date of collision, and
Allstate's motion for summary judgment was granted. On appeal the court
took notice of a recent case' ° in which the Texas Supreme Court stated that
evidence that notice of cancellation was not received constitutes some evidence
that the notice was not mailed; however, the court held that the plaintiff's refusal to admit receiving notice of cancellation was insufficient as summary
judgment evidence, and affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court of Texas
in Torres v. Western Casualty & Surety Co."' reversed the summary judgment
for similar reasons. The plaintiff alleged that he had good cause for filing his
claim for workmen's compensation a year later than required by statute, and
that the defendant was granted a summary judgment on the basis of proof
of late filing only. Summary judgment was held improper because the defendant's summary judgment proof was insufficient to overcome the plaintiff's
allegations of good cause. Similarly, in Parr v. Fortson" an attorney sued for
reasonable attorney's fees, and included in his motion for summary judgment
affidavits from three other attorneys stating what reasonable fees would be.
The court of civil appeals reversed summary judgment for the attorney be74TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5538 (1958).
75 458 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970), error ref. ir.e.
"White v. Bond, 362 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1962).
77450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1970).
" Id. at 828.
79456 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970), error dismissed.
80 Sudduth v. Commonwealth County Mut. Ins. Co., 454 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1970).
" 457 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1970).
8' 457 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970).
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cause the affidavits did not prove that there was no genuine issue of fact, but
only raised the issue of reasonableness.
was involved in Perkins v. Crittenden," in which the
Rule 166-A(e)
plaintiff was granted a summary judgment in an action on a promissory note.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's noncompliance with rule
166-A(e), which requires that a sworn or certified copy of the note be attached
to the petition, by attaching only an acknowledged copy, precluded the
granting of a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the face of a
general denial because the plaintiff had not proved that he was the owner
of the note and in possession.
VIII. VENUE
Litigation concerning the exceptions to the general venue statute' continued
during the past year. In Hanover Insurance Co. v. Sanford" the plaintiffs
sought to support venue in the county of their residence under subdivision
2787 by proving that the local sales agent of the defendant foreign corporation
was an "agency or representative" of that corporation. The court of civil
appeals accepted this argument, and further held that the plaintiffs were not
required to prove a cause of action against the foreign corporation in order to
sustain venue under subdivision 27. Judge Keith concurred, but pointed out
that the difference which had developed in the law in treatment of foreign
corporations under subdivision 27 (no proof of cause of action required)
and domestic corporations under subdivision 23"8 (proof of cause of action required) is "an obnoxious and discriminatory result . . . [whichl should be
called to the attention of the Legislature."89
The issue in Hudgens v. Bain Equipment & Tube Sales, Inc." was whether
a partnership should be considered an "association" under subdivision 23. The
court agreed with the view of Professor Alan R. Bromberg of the Southern
Methodist University School of Law,"1 and held that the partnership entity is
3

TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1970).
1 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (1964). As a general rule defendants may be
sued only in the county of their residence, but the subdivisions of art. 1995 provide exceptions to that rule.
8457 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970).
87
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 27 (1964) provides:
Foreign corporations, private or public, joint stock companies or associations,
not incorporated by the laws of this State, and doing business within this State,
may be sued in any county where the cause of action or a part thereof accrued,
or in any county where such company may have an agency or representative,
or in the county in which the principal office of such company may be situated; or, when the defendant corporation has no agent or representative in
this State, then in the county where the plaintiffs or either of them, reside.
8 ld., § 23 provides in part:
Suits against a private corporation, association, or joint stock company may
be brought in the county in which its principal office is situated; or in the
county in which the cause of action or part thereof arose; or in the county
in which the plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action or part thereof
arose; provided such corporation, association, or company has an agency or
representative in such county . ...
'9457 S.W.2d at 119 (concurring opinion). Judge Keith's opinion contains an excellent
discussion of this anomaly and its sources.
90459 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970).
" 1Bromberg, Source and Comments, 17 TEx. REv. Civ, STAT. ANN. 300 (1970).
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an "association" for venue purposes under subdivision 23.
Interpretation of subdivision 4" was involved in Jefferson Chemical Co. v.
Forney Engineering Co. 3 After an explosion in the waste heat boiler at the
plaintiff's plant, the plaintiff brought suit against the companies that supplied
the plant with natural gas and the companies that manufactured safety equipment designed to prevent such an explosion. The plaintiff alleged that one of
the causes of the explosion was the failure of the natural gas suppliers to maintain adequate pressure in the gas lines to the plaintiff's plant. The suit was
brought in Harris County, the residence of the defendant natural gas suppliers.
Forney Engineering, one of the manufacturers of safety equipment, claimed that
it was entitled to a change of venue because the action against the suppliers
was essentially in contract, while the action against Forney was in tort, and,
therefore, there was no joint cause of action to sustain venue under subdivision
4. The court decided that the entire suit was one sounding in tort and that the
link between the two causes of action was "sufficiently close to bring the entire
suit under subdivision 4.""
In Cranbrook Corp.. v. Wright"5 the plaintiff brought suit in Harris county
on two separate causes of action. The first involved a promissory note payable
in Harris County, and the second involved a debt arising out of a joint venture
of the plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a plea of privilege, alleging
that the entire suit, or alternatively, the action on the debt, should be transferred
to his residence, El Paso County. The trial court transferred the entire suit to
El Paso County. On appeal the court held that Harris County was proper venue
under subdivision 5" for the action on the promissory note, and that the debt
action could be properly joined under the Middlebrook doctrine ' to avoid multiplicity of suits.
In Chesbrough v. State"9 the suit was originally brought in Bexar County
against a Bexar County resident. Harris County defendants were added four
years later, when there were no Bexar County residents involved in the suit because the original defendant had moved to Harris County. The court, recognizing the general rule that venue is determined by residence at the time the case
is filed,9 held that since there were no Bexar County residents involved in the
suit at the time the amended petition adding the Harris County defendants was
filed, subdivision 4 would not support venue in Bexar County for the cause of
action against the Harris County defendants.
11TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN, art. 1995, 5 4 (1964) provides in part: "If two or more
defendants reside in different counties, suit may be brought in any county where one of the
defendants resides."
93466 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston List Dist.) 1971).

" Id.at 364.

95469 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971).
"9 Venue was alleged under Tax. Rai.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, 5 5 (1964), which
provides: "If a person has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a particular
county, expressly naming such county, or a definite place therein, by such writing, suit upon
or by reason of such obligation may be brought against him, either in such county or where
the defendant has his domicile."

"7 Middlebrook v. David Bradley Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 706, 26 S.W. 935 (1894). See also
Stevens v. Southern Ice & Util. Co., 37 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931).
8465 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971).
"Haney v. Henry, 307 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1957).
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In Romer v. Gruver State Bankt" the bank brought suit on a promissory note
signed by James C. Romer and payable in Hansford County. Venue was pleaded in Hansford County under subdivision 5. The plaintiff alleged that James
C. Romer signed the note as the agent of a partnership, the members of which
were also made defendants. These other defendants, who had not signed the
note, filed pleas of privilege and alleged that no partnership existed. The appellate court held that venue was proper as to James C. Romer under subdivision 5 and that venue was proper as to the other defendants under subdivision
29a."' The court thought that the question of the existence of the partnership
was a matter which should be considered at trial rather than at the venue hearing.
In Heldt Bros. Trucks v. Silva" it was held that venue could not be sustained under subdivision 4 because the plaintiff did not properly allege a cause of
action against the nonresident defendant involved. The plaintiff had asserted
a cause of action against "a corporation by the name of Heldt Brothers Trucks."
The court held that this was not sufficient to give notice of suit to "Heldt Bros.
Trucks, a partnership."
IX. MISCELLANEOUS

State v. Cook United, Inc."'° was one more episode of the continuing dispute
between the state and certain stores over the Sunday Closing Law."' The stores
had been engaging in the practice of selling their merchandise on Saturday
night to Sundaco, Inc., which leased the stores' premises for Sunday and sold
back the remaining merchandise on Sunday night. The state, maintaining that
the whole operation was a sham intended to evade the closing law, filed suits
in several counties seeking injunctive relief to prevent the stores from continuing to operate in violation of the law. The stores' response was to allege that
the state was subjecting them to a multiplicity of suits, harassment, and vexatious litigation. They further asked for injunctive relief to prevent the state,
its subdivisions, and their employees from filing any new causes of action seeking injunctive or civil relief similar to that sought by the suits already filed.
The trial court granted the injunction. On appeal the state argued that the
granting of the injunction was error because its effect was to enjoin the enforcement of a penal statute. The appellate court, admitting that article 28 6 a is a
criminal statute, nevertheless rejected this argument by observing that the state
was only prevented from seeking additional injunctive or civil relief, and that
new criminal actions were not forbidden by the injunction. According to the
court, the effect of the action of the trial court was merely
to tell the State that you already have these people in court; the relief you seek
against them of enjoining them from violating the statute can be obtained in
100456 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970).
101
TF. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN'. art. 1995, § 29a (1964) provides: "Whenever there are
two or more defendants in any suit brought in any county in this State and such suit is
lawfully maintainable therein under the provisions of Article 1995 as to any of such defendants, then such suit may be maintained in such county against any and all necessary
parties thereto."
102464 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971).
10'463 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971).
""4TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 286a (Supp. 1972).
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the suits that you have already filed; quit filing different and additional suits
all over the State involving the same people, alleging substantially the same
facts and seeking the same relief; and get in there and try one or more of these
pending cases on the merits to a final conclusion and get the matters in controversy between you and appellees over with.0 '
In Stroud v. Stiff, °"8 a dispute between city officials over who had the authority to call an election and appoint election judges, the mayor sought an injunction to prevent the other city officials from proceeding under two election
resolutions. The trial court refused to take jurisdiction over the controversy
because of its political nature. The appellate court affirmed, noting the "well
settled Texas rule of judicial noninterference in the exercise of political power
through election." '°
In Speaker v. Lawler"° the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment for the
purpose of interpreting a prior judgment of the same court. The appellate court
held that Texas' declaratory judgment act10 could not be used for such a purpose.

'" 463 S.W.2d at 513-14. The supreme court modified the judgment of the court of
civil appeals, finding error in the breadth of the trial court's injunction. Relying on TEX.
R. Civ. P. 681, the court held that because only the proper officials of Tarrant and McLennon
Counties were served or given notice of the temporary injunction hearing, all county and
district attorneys of the state were not effectively enjoined by the trial court. 469 S.W.2d
709 (Tex.1971).
106465 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971).
107Id. at 408.
108463 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
109TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (1965).

